West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer Blog : Ronald Chapman: West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer | Florida Criminal Attorney: DUI, Assault & Battery, Felonies | Criminal Law Firm

          Florida law states that "a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts."

          In the case of Theron Toson versus the State of Florida, the issue was whether Mr. Toson could be found guilty of both grand theft and dealing in the property that was stolen in the grand theft case.  Toson argued that his conviction for both crimes violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and the Florida law quoted above.

          Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Toson stating:

"In [this] case, the information, the [police report], and the factual basis presented, established that the grand theft and three charges of dealing in stolen property to which Toson was making his open pleas, all involved the same property stolen in the course of a burglary of Patricia Gillette's home.   Toson testified at the plea hearing, without contradiction, that he sold the stolen items in order to support his crack cocaine addiction.

This court, in [the case of Blair versus the State of Florida], addressed a similar fact situation.   In Blair, the information charged the defendant with stealing jewelry on one date and dealing in the same jewelry on the same date or sometime thereafter.   The [State Attorney] was unable to prove the theft of the jewelry and the dealing of the same jewelry were distinct and unrelated criminal incidents.   Our court stated as follows:

'While we recognize that additional acts will always be required to dispose of the property in question, the legislative purpose of the [law quoted above] is to prevent dual convictions in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.   Absent something more to purposefully interrupt the two crimes by an unquestionably disjunctive period of time or series of events, defendant's conviction for one of the offenses must be set aside' "(italics added).

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         In the case of Casey Steil versus the State of Florida, Mr. Steil was convicted of the crime of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer based on the following facts:

          "At around 4:00 a.m., three officers in a restaurant went outside after hearing there was going   to be a fight in the parking lot. One of the officers held out his hand and yelled 'stop' to [Steil], who made eye contact with the officer, but did not stop his vehicle as he was leaving the parking lot. The officer testified that he was attempting to stop [Steil] in order to determine if he had been involved in the reported disturbance. He had no reason to believe [Steil] may have been involved in a crime.

          The officer testified that [Steil] squealed his tires as the car left the parking lot at about fifteen to twenty miles an hour. Another officer in a car followed [Steil], but did not get closer than within a block, and as that officer turned on his siren and blue lights, [Steil] was a block away turning onto another street. When the officer turned onto that street, he turned off his siren. Then, after observing [Steil] run two stop signs, the officer also turned off his blue lights and took a parallel road, thinking [Steil] would come back to U.S. 1. The officer estimated that he was driving fifteen to twenty miles an hour over the thirty-five mile an hour speed limit and [Steil] was driving a little faster. He then again encountered [Steil], saw him run a stop sign with a red flashing light, and [Steil] then stopped at a red light. At that point, the officer activated his blue lights and [Steil] pulled over.  The officer testified that he had arrested [Steil] for reckless driving, but he had not actually clocked [Steil's] speed. Nor did he observe any other vehicles affected by [Steil's] driving."

          Steil appealed his conviction to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal where he argued that while the fleeing or eluding statute prohibits driving at a "high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," no evidence was presented at his trial that he had done either of those things.

          The appellate court agreed with Steil for the following reasons:

           1.  Aggravated fleeing requires that the pursuing officer has his lights and sirens on.

          2.  In this case, the officer testified that he did not have them on during most of the pursuit.

          3.  There was insufficient evidence of high speed or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, while the officer's lights and siren were on, to support Steil's conviction for aggravated fleeing.

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           In the case of Kopelovich versus Kopelovich, a domestic violence injunction was issued against Mr. Kopelovich based on the following facts:

         Mrs. Kopelovich filed a form petition that asked her to describe the latest act or threat of violence that caused her to honestly fear imminent domestic violence by Mr. Kopelovich.   She responded that he had:  

          1.  Threatened to harm her dog;  

          2.  Threatened to harm her in court and destroy her financially;  and

          3.  Emotionally abused her by brainwashing her, lying to her, and embarrassing her in front of her family. 

          Based upon these accusations, a judge issued a temporary injunction against Mr. Kopelovich.  However, Mr. Kopelovich appealed that decision to Florida's Second District Court of Appeal which ruled that this injunction should not have been entered because Mrs. Kopelovich's petition failed to establish:

          1.  Immediate or present danger; 

          2.  The threat of domestic violence; or

          3.  Actual domestic violence.

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           In the case of United States of America versus Goldin Industries, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a RICO conviction because the indictment failed to distinguish between a "person" and an "enterprise."

          An article that I posted on my website, Federal Criminal Lawyer:  Frequently Asked Questions, examines this case and why the appellate court thought it so important to make this distinction.

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