A Conspiracy Does Not Exist if One of the Co-Conspirators is a Law Enforcement Agent

           In the case of Sheriff versus State of Florida, an individual named Myron Sheriff was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in heroin.  He appealed his conviction to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal.  That appellate court reversed his conviction and in doing so stated the following:

 

          1.  A conspiracy is either an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense.

 

          2.  In order to prove the crime of conspiracy, a prosecutor must prove an agreement and an intention to commit a criminal offense.

 

          3.  Conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime from the offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

 

          4.  Evidence that an individual assisted in the commission of the criminal offense is not, by itself, sufficient to prove that he participated in the conspiracy.

 

          5.  In this case, the prosecutor failed to prove that Mr. Sheriff entered into an agreement to traffic in heroin with codefendant Laura Arroyo or with an unindicted co-conspirator identified as “Solon."   At most, the evidence showed only an agreement between Sheriff and someone named Siegel who was working for the police as a confidential informant.  However, a conspiracy does not exist if one of the two co-conspirators is a government agent.

 

          6.  Insofar as co-defendant Arroyo was concerned, the evidence established that she was simply present at the scene of Mr. Sheriff's drug transaction with the confidential informant and that she allowed Sheriff to drive her car to that location.   This evidence, even when combined with Sheriff's statement following his arrest that Arroyo “knew what was going on,” was not sufficient to establish a criminal conspiracy between Arroyo and Sheriff.

 

          7.  Finally, Sheriff's mere statement to the police that a man named “Solon” was his heroin supplier was likewise insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction because no evidence was presented at trial proving that Sheriff actually contacted or conspired with "Solon" or that such a person even existed.

A Conspiracy Does Not Exist Unless There is an Agreement to Commit the Same Crime

           In the case of Gregory Schlicher versus State of Florida, Mr. Schlicher was convicted of six counts of conspiracy to purchase cocaine as well as two other charges.  The facts of his case are as follows:

 

          "During  the  trial,  the  [prosecutor]  presented  a  number  of  police  witnesses who  testified  that  the police were conducting an investigation, primarily through  wiretaps,  of  a  cocaine  trafficking  organization  headed by Jose Tzoc-Caxaj.  Schlicher was not the target of the investigation, but came  to  be known  to  police  when he  purchased  cocaine  from  Jose. Schlicher admitted to police that he had purchased cocaine consistently from Jose for his own use, but maintained that he was not a drug dealer.  The  [prosecutor]  also  introduced  recordings  of  the wiretapped conversations between Jose and Schlicher.  Those conversations are, in large part, the basis of the charges against Schlicher."

 

           Schlicher appealed the jury's verdict, arguing that the prosecutor failed to prove that he committed the crime of conspiracy to purchase cocaine.  Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with him stating:

 

          1.   A conspiracy exists when there is either an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense, as well as an intention to commit that offense.

 

          2.  Direct proof of the agreement is not necessary; it may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

 

          3.  Florida appellate courts have typically upheld convictions for conspiracies to buy or sell drugs when the "defendants are involved in a series of meetings, arrangements and negotiations to sell or buy illegal drugs that lead to such sale or purchase."

 

          4.  The agreement that constitutes the conspiracy must be an agreement to commit the same criminal offense.

 

           5.  In a buy-sell transaction, that agreement usually does not exist because the buyer and seller each intend to commit a different crime.  As a result, there is no criminal conspiracy to achieve a common goal.

 

           6.  There was no criminal conspiracy to pursue a common goal in this case because Schlicher was charged with conspiracy to buy cocaine while Jose was charged with conspiracy to sell cocaine.  Therefore, no evidence was presented proving either an express or implied agreement between the two men to commit the same crime of purchasing cocaine.

Conspiracy and Double Jeopardy

          In the case of Negron Gil De Rubio versus the State of Florida, Mr. Negron was convicted of both conspiracy to commit racketeering and conspiracy to commit drug trafficking after evidence was presented at his trial that he and others were involved in smuggling cocaine into Florida from Puerto Rico and then taking money back to Puerto Rico.

 

          Negron appealed to Florida's Second District Court of Appeal on the ground that his two conspiracy convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

 

          The appellate court began its analysis by noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple convictions and multiple punishments for the same crime.  The court continued on to state that a person commits the crime of criminal conspiracy when he agrees with another person or persons to commit a crime.  However, if there is only one agreement, then there is only one conspiracy even if that conspiracy happens to involve the committing of several crimes.

 

          In Negron's case, the prosecution proved that Negron took part in only one conspiracy that happened to involve the commission of two different crimes--racketeering and drug trafficking.  And because no evidence was presented at his trial suggesting that a first conspiracy was completed, abandoned, or otherwise ended before the formation of a second conspiracy, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed Negron's conviction and sentence for  conspiracy to commit racketeering.

When is an Automobile Passenger Not Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit a Federal Drug Crime?

          When someone is charged in an alleged drug conspiracy and that person is located in an automobile that has drugs in it at the time of his arrest, it is not enough that he is merely present in the car; there must also be “circumstances evidencing a consciousness of guilt” on his part before he can be convicted of conspiracy.  My website, Federal Criminal Lawyer:  Frequently Asked Questions, contains an article that examines one case in which such circumstances were not present.