West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer Blog : Ronald Chapman: West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer | Florida Criminal Attorney: DUI, Assault & Battery, Felonies | Criminal Law Firm

          Do current immigration laws in the United States encourage one spouse to falsely accuse the other spouse of domestic violence?  This became an important question in a recent case of mine in which my client, who was a permanent legal resident of the United States, was accused by his wife of domestic battery. 

          My client and his wife were going through a divorce, and she was living in the U.S. illegally.  My client maintained that she was falsely accusing him of domestic battery so that she could become a legal resident of the United States.  With that thought in mind, I began researching the relationship between U.S. immigration laws and domestic violence.  What I discovered was eye opening.

          Federal law provides that battered spouses may petition the Attorney General for legal residency in the United States.  Moreover, if the battered spouse is divorced from the abusive spouse after filing the petition, the fact that a divorce occurred is not supposed to affect the approval of the petition.

          Federal law also provides for the issuance of what are called "U visas."  The purpose of this visa is to give victims of domestic violence temporary legal status and work eligibility in the United States for up to 4 years.  An application for the U visa is filed with Form I-918.  According to section 1.D. of Form I-918, "[a] Federal, State or local government official investigating or prosecuting a qualifying criminal activity [such as domestic violence] certifies . . . that you have been, you are being or you are likely to be helpful to the official in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal act of which you are a victim."  In other words, it is not enough for one spouse to simply accuse the other spouse of domestic violence;  the complaining spouse must actually file a formal complaint with the prosecuting authorities in order to potentially qualify for a U visa.

          Because federal law can provide a powerful motive for a spouse who is living illegally in the United States to falsely accuse the other spouse of domestic violence, it is essential to thoroughly explore that motive in cases of domestic battery.

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          On February 23, 2009, I posted an article on this site entitled Why Florida Jurors Are Rarely Allowed to Hear Evidence of Previous False Accusations.  In that article, I discussed two Florida cases, Pantoja v. State of Florida and Washington v. State of Florida, both of which held that jurors should not have been allowed to hear evidence that a prosecution witness had previously made false accusations against another person.  At the conclusion of that article, I noted that Florida's Second District Court of Appeal (fortunately) sees things differently when it comes to allowing jurors to hear such evidence.

         For example, in the case of Jaggers v. State of Florida, Mr. Jaggers was charged with committing the crime of sexual battery on three children, all of whom were less than eleven years old.  At Jaggers's trial, a key witness for the prosecutor was a ten-year-old girl who testified that Jaggers had put his finger into her rectum three to five years earlier.  When Jaggers's lawyer tried to cross-examine the girl about the fact that she had previously accused her own father of sexually assaulting her and then later admitted that her accusation was false, the trial judge did not allow Jaggers's lawyer to do so "on the basis of the very broad general principle of law that the credibility of a witness may not be impeached by proof that the witness has committed specific acts of misconduct."

          The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by not permitting such cross-examination because "[t]here is a long line of authority from this court and others which permits the type of testimony on cross-examination that was prohibited here.  Evidence that is relevant to the possible bias, prejudice, motive, intent or corruptness of a witness is nearly always not only admissible, but necessary, where the jury must know of any improper motives of a prosecuting witness in determining that witness' credibility.  That is particularly true in the case of allegations of sexual abuse where there is no independent evidence of the abuse and the defendant's sole defense is either fabrication or mistake on the part of the alleged victims."

         Ten years later, the Second District Court of Appeal was presented with a similar issue in the case of Cliburn v. State of Florida.  In that case, Mr. Cliburn was charged with burglarizing his former girlfriend's apartment and of violating a domestic violence injunction.  The evidence at trial boiled down to a swearing match between Cliburn and the former girlfriend.  In spite of that, Cliburn's attorney was not allowed to cross-examine the former girlfriend about the fact that she had previously filed a false kidnapping charge against another boyfriend.

          On appeal, the Court ruled that not permitting such cross-examination was error because "evidence relevant to a prosecuting witness's possible bias or corruptness is admissible.  When assessing a key witness's credibility, the jury must know about any improper motives."

          It would certainly appear that Jaggers and Cliburn were decided correctly since it is settled law in the United States that cross-examination is nearly always proper where it exposes a witness's bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive to testify.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in the case of Davis v. Alaska, "[a] more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' . . .  We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination."

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          In many criminal cases, the evidence presented at trial boils down to one witness accusing the person on trial of committing an illegal act.  For example, in some rape cases, the prosecution's main evidence consists of the alleged rape victim's testimony that the accused individual is the man who raped her.  It sometimes happens, though, that the person making the accusation has previously made false accusations against either the person on trial or against other people.  When that happens, it would seem only right that the jury deciding the case should be allowed to hear about those previous false allegations so that it can better judge the credibility of the person making the accusation.  In Florida, however, jurors are rarely allowed to hear such evidence.

          Why not, you may well ask.  The recent case of Pantoja v. State of Florida attempts to answer that particular question. 

          Mr. Pantoja was charged with sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation.  At his trial, he intended to present evidence that the alleged victim had previously accused her uncle (who was not on trial) of molesting her but then later admitted that her uncle had not, in fact, done so.  The trial judge ruled that Pantoja could not present such evidence. 

          When the case later reached the First District Court of Appeal, that appellate court agreed with the trial judge that such evidence was indeed inadmissible because of the "well-settled rule that a witness' credibility may not be attacked by proof that she committed specific acts of misconduct that did not end in a criminal conviction."  In other words, because the alleged victim's recantation of her accusation against her uncle did not result in a criminal conviction, Pantoja was not allowed to present evidence of that recantation at his trial.

          Florida's First District Court of Appeal is not the only appellate court in Florida to rule that a witness' credibility may not be attacked by proof that the witness committed specific acts of misconduct that did not result in a criminal conviction. 

          For example, in the case of Washington v. State of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge was correct when he refused to allow the defendant to present evidence at his trial that the alleged victim in that particular case had previously filed a false police report in another, unrelated case.

          Fortunately, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal sees things a little differently.  In my next article, I will discuss two cases decided by that appellate court, both cases reaching a different conclusion than that reached in Pantoja and Washington.

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Unfortunately, we are often inclined to automatically believe the accusations that others make without first checking out their story.  The inevitable result is that we are sometimes duped into believing false accusations.  When false accusations are made in the criminal justice system, the consequences can be devastating.  Fortunately for a man in Texas, an accusation of murder lodged against him by his wife was discovered to be false before he had to stand trial.  He was fortunate.  Some are not.  What follows is a brief recounting of his story.

Tracy Denise Roberson convicted of involuntary manslaughter

7:21 PM CDT, May 2, 2008 

FORT WORTH, Texas - A Texas woman who caused her lover's shooting death by falsely crying rape was convicted Friday of involuntary manslaughter.

Tracy Denise Roberson, 37, cried a bit when the verdict was announced. The punishment phase was set for Monday, and she faces two to 20 years in prison.

In late 2006, Darrell Roberson came home from a late-night card game to find his scantily clad wife with another man in a pickup truck in the driveway. Tracy Roberson was with her lover but cried rape, and her husband fired four shots into the truck as Devin LaSalle drove off, killing him.

Darrell Roberson initially was arrested, but a murder charge was later dropped and a grand jury indicted Tracy Roberson instead.

During her three-day trial, defense attorneys called no witnesses but blamed LaSalle's death on Darrell Roberson's jealousy and rage.

But prosecutors placed all the blame on Tracy Roberson, showing evidence of the affair with LaSalle, 32, and a text message in which she invited him to her house that evening.

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The Fall 2007 edition of the Florida Defender, a publication of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, contains an article entitled "False Allegations of Sexual Assault:  Why Do People Lie?" 

In that article, the authors make the insightful observation that "[c]ases of self-inflicted injury are particularly insidious because, except in suicide attempts, law enforcement officers are not accustomed to the phenomenon, and tend to presume the injuries are caused by others.  More important, persuading jurors that an apparent victim is capable of such bizarre behavior is difficult."

A few years ago, I represented a man whose wife claimed that he had attacked her with a box cutter outside the courthouse.  The police had taken the woman to their department where they photographed her injuries which consisted of some parallel cuts on one of her wrists. 

My client adamantly denied his wife's accusation, and there was reason to believe he was telling the truth.  His wife had a documented history of mental-health problems, and she and my client were currently going through a divorce.

I sent the photographs of the wife's injuries to a forensic pathologist who immediately concluded that they were self-inflicted.  When I told this to the prosecutor on the case (and to his boss), both dismissed the expert's conclusion.  The case proceeded to trial.

At trial the jury (aided by the forensic pathologist's testimony) concluded that my client was not guilty of any wrongdoing.  After the trial, several of the jurors asked me why the case had not been dismissed by the prosecutor since the woman's injuries were clearly self-inflicted. 

I have since wondered why experienced prosecutors could not see what was so obvious to those jurors who had no training in the law.

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