West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer Blog : Ronald Chapman: West Palm Beach Criminal Lawyer | Florida Criminal Attorney: DUI, Assault & Battery, Felonies | Criminal Law Firm

          In many criminal cases, the evidence presented at trial boils down to one witness accusing the person on trial of committing an illegal act.  For example, in some rape cases, the prosecution's main evidence consists of the alleged rape victim's testimony that the accused individual is the man who raped her.  It sometimes happens, though, that the person making the accusation has previously made false accusations against either the person on trial or against other people.  When that happens, it would seem only right that the jury deciding the case should be allowed to hear about those previous false allegations so that it can better judge the credibility of the person making the accusation.  In Florida, however, jurors are rarely allowed to hear such evidence.

          Why not, you may well ask.  The recent case of Pantoja v. State of Florida attempts to answer that particular question. 

          Mr. Pantoja was charged with sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation.  At his trial, he intended to present evidence that the alleged victim had previously accused her uncle (who was not on trial) of molesting her but then later admitted that her uncle had not, in fact, done so.  The trial judge ruled that Pantoja could not present such evidence. 

          When the case later reached the First District Court of Appeal, that appellate court agreed with the trial judge that such evidence was indeed inadmissible because of the "well-settled rule that a witness' credibility may not be attacked by proof that she committed specific acts of misconduct that did not end in a criminal conviction."  In other words, because the alleged victim's recantation of her accusation against her uncle did not result in a criminal conviction, Pantoja was not allowed to present evidence of that recantation at his trial.

          Florida's First District Court of Appeal is not the only appellate court in Florida to rule that a witness' credibility may not be attacked by proof that the witness committed specific acts of misconduct that did not result in a criminal conviction. 

          For example, in the case of Washington v. State of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge was correct when he refused to allow the defendant to present evidence at his trial that the alleged victim in that particular case had previously filed a false police report in another, unrelated case.

          Fortunately, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal sees things a little differently.  In my next article, I will discuss two cases decided by that appellate court, both cases reaching a different conclusion than that reached in Pantoja and Washington.

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          Wayne R. Lafave, a noted criminal-law scholar, has said that "there is no dispute that [police searches based upon consent] affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year."  That being the case, it is not surprising that the United States Supreme Court has, over the years, addressed the lawfulness of particular searches by the police that were based upon consent.  Several of those opinions dealt in particular with searches of homes.

          The High Court has consistently said that our homes are entitled to special constitutional protection because they are the center of our private lives.  For example, in the case of Miller v. United States, the Court stated that "[f]rom earliest days, the common law drastically limited the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest.  Such action invades the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle." 

          However, it is not necessary for the police to break down the door of someone's home if they have the consent of one of the residents to enter and search that person's home.  But are the police allowed to do that if one of the occupants of the home says they can while another occupant who is physically present says that the police cannot?  That was the question that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed in the case of Georgia v. Randolph.

         What occurred in the Randolph case is that Janet Randolph called the police after having a dispute with her husband, Scott Randolph, which ended up with Scott taking their son to a neighbor's house.  When the police arrived, Janet told them that Scott abused drugs and that there was evidence of that inside her home.   One of the officers then asked Scott for permission to search his house which he flatly refused.  Janet, however, did consent to such a search which ultimately resulted in Scott being indicted for possession of cocaine.

          The case eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court where Scott argued that the police violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution when they initially entered his home without a search warrant.  The Supreme Court agreed with Scott and ruled that the evidence obtained by the police had to be suppressed because "there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another."

          Although the Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a right to enter Scott's home without a warrant, it suggested that its ruling might have been different had the police needed to enter the home in order to physically protect Janet from Scott or to prevent Scott from destroying evidence of drug use.  The result would also have been different had Scott not been physically present to object; in that case, Janet's consent would have prevailed, and the resulting search would have been upheld by the Court.

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          In many cases in which the police want to search someone's car or home, they try to obtain the owner's verbal or written consent so that they do not have to get a search warrant from a judge or otherwise be concerned about the lawfulness of conducting a search.  But if the lawfulness of a particular search does become an issue later on when the case goes to court, the prosecutor may have to prove that the person's consent was given freely and voluntarily.  She may also have to prove that even if consent was originally given freely and voluntarily, it was not later withdrawn by the accused individual's words or actions or by the words or actions of the police.  If the prosecutor cannot prove those things, then the judge hearing the case may rule that some or all of the incriminating evidence that the police acquired is inadmissible at trial.  When that happens, a prosecutor is sometimes forced to drop the case because she does not have enough evidence to obtain a conviction.

          The lawfulness of a search following consent was at issue in the recent case of Johnson v. State of Florida.  In that particular case, Mr. Johnson was charged with possessing illegal drugs that were found on his person while being searched by a police officer by the side of the road.  After being arrested, Johnson filed a motion to suppress that incriminating evidence arguing that although his consent may have originally been given freely and voluntarily, that consent was later invalidated or effectively withdrawn when the police themselves engaged in unlawful conduct.

          Florida's First District Court of Appeal agreed with Mr. Johnson and in doing so found the following facts to be of particular significance:

•  The police officer who searched Johnson first asked him and the driver if there was anything illegal in the car and then asked if they would consent to a search of their persons;
• Both Johnson and the driver consented to being searched, but before he was searched, Johnson opened his car door in order to get out;
• When he did that, the officer told him "to sit tight";
• By then, two other officers had arrived and were standing behind car in which Johnson was a passenger;
• After searching the driver, one of the officers told Johnson to get out of the car so that he could search him;
• That officer found a small bag of cocaine in Johnson's front coat pocket and marijuana in his sock.

         The appellate court ruled that although Johnson's consent was originally given freely and voluntarily, it was effectively withdrawn by the police themselves when he was ordered to "sit tight" because the officer who gave that order had no lawful basis for detaining him at that particular point in time.  As the Johnson Court aptly noted, "it seems logical that an illegal detention would taint everything which follows it, including the continuing validity of consent given prior to the illegal detention."

          Johnson's case is significant because of the court's well-reasoned conclusion that his consent was invalidated not by his own words or actions but rather by the unlawful action of the police in ordering him to remain in the car when there was no legal justification for their doing so.

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